Difference between revisions of "Non-monotonic logic"
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* [[Circumscription (logic)]] | * [[Circumscription (logic)]] | ||
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* [[Logic]] | * [[Logic]] | ||
* [[Logic programming]] | * [[Logic programming]] | ||
Revision as of 09:13, 10 March 2016
A non-monotonic logic is a formal logic whose consequence relation is not monotonic.
Description
In other words, non-monotonic logics are devised to capture and represent defeasible inferences (c.f. defeasible reasoning), i.e., a kind of inference in which reasoners draw tentative conclusions, enabling reasoners to retract their conclusion(s) based on further evidence.
Most studied formal logics have a monotonic consequence relation, meaning that adding a formula to a theory never produces a reduction of its set of consequences.
Intuitively, monotonicity indicates that learning a new piece of knowledge cannot reduce the set of what is known.
A monotonic logic cannot handle various reasoning tasks such as reasoning by default (consequences may be derived only because of lack of evidence of the contrary), abductive reasoning (consequences are only deduced as most likely explanations), some important approaches to reasoning about knowledge (the ignorance of a consequence must be retracted when the consequence becomes known), and similarly, belief revision (new knowledge may contradict old beliefs).
See also
- Circumscription (logic)
- Consequence relation
- Frame problem
- Logic
- Logic programming
- Monotonicity of entailment
- Negation as failure
- Rational consequence relation
- Stable model semantics
External links
- Non-monotonic logic @ Wikipedia
