Difference between revisions of "Gödel's incompleteness theorems"
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* [[Kurt Gödel|Gödel, Kurt]] | * [[Kurt Gödel|Gödel, Kurt]] | ||
* [[Mathematical logic]] | * [[Mathematical logic]] | ||
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== External links == | == External links == | ||
* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems Gödel's incompleteness theorems] @ Wikipedia | * [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems Gödel's incompleteness theorems] @ Wikipedia | ||
Revision as of 06:57, 21 August 2015
Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic.
The theorems, proven by Kurt Gödel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics.
The two results are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that David Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible, giving a negative answer to Hilbert's second problem.
The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an "effective procedure" (e.g., a computer program, but it could be any sort of algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the relations of the natural numbers (arithmetic). For any such system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system.
The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.
See also
External links
- Gödel's incompleteness theorems @ Wikipedia
